219 that had already passed through a phase of "industrial revolution" were modern in this sense. 7 For Taixu, modernity therefore entailed coherence with current trends of Western origin. On this basis, the following analysis will focus on his use of Yogācāra in discussions of contemporary science and Western philosophy, including social evolution, psychology, the theory of relativity, biology, and the reformation of the individual. The chapter will draw on Taixu's writings and speeches from the time of the May Fourth movement in 1919, with its calls to replace religion with science and democracy, through to the 1930s.
The focus of the chapter, however, will be on Taixu's writings from the 1920s. While this period saw the rise of an antireligious movement associated with Marxism, other aspects of the time made it hostile to religion as well. The Guomindang (GMD), which formed a national government in 1927, assumed that "society was knowable and changeable by science," and "that history was moving toward a new stage in which the harmful legacies of the past (especially ignorance and superstition) could be dealt a fatal and definitive blow." 8 Beginning in the early twentieth century, "'science' often came to be the touchstone in dividing between 'religion' (compatible with science) and 'superstition' (unscientific), so that the three formed a triangle in modernist rhetoric." 9 Within this context, demonstrating Buddhism's coherence with science was necessary if it was to gain intellectual and political acceptance.
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Taixu's discussions of the similarities between Buddhism and modern ideas from the West were therefore expedient, but also reflected his firm beliefs. 10 He located a model for Buddhism's modernization in Sun Yat-sen's "Three Principles of the People" (Sanminzhuyi 三民 主義)-the driving ideology of the GMD-which he considered to have successfully merged traditional Chinese culture with modernity. 11 Like Sanminzhuyi, Taixu thought that Buddhism could adapt to new contexts while preserving its unchanging, fundamental tenets. 12 The multidimensional nature of his engagement with the world of non-Buddhist ideas, some of which were antithetical to religion, thus points to the complexity of Taixu's thought, and suggests that he should be considered more than an exclusively Buddhist thinker.
Taixu's views were forged in opposition to the atheistic tendencies of the 1920s. In 1922, the Anti-Christian Student Federation (Feijidujiao xuesheng tongmeng 非基督教學生同盟), and an outgrowth of this organization, the Anti-Religion Federation (Feizongjiao tongmeng 非宗教 同盟), had opposed the World Student Christian Federation (Shijie Jidujiao xuesheng tongmeng 世界基督教學生同盟) meeting in Beijing. 13 The years 1923 and 1924 also saw the beginning of a debate between advocates of science and those of metaphysics concerning which was most 10 Taixu, "Rensheng Foxue de shuoming 人生佛學的說明" (An Explanation of Buddhism for Human Life)," in 
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The scientific method
The links between science and Buddhism can be seen from Taixu's discussions of one of the pillars of Western modernity: the scientific method itself. Although he considered the scientific method to be flawed, he also believed that it could be improved on through the introduction of concepts from Yogācāra. The underlying problem with the scientific method was that it relied on the imperfect observations of deluded beings. For example, in a 1919 piece entitled "Materialist Science and the Study of Yogācāra," he explained that research on optics and electricity had shown all phenomena to consist of impermanent false forms (jiaxiang 假相) that were in a continual state of flux. 41 Although science had verified this, Yogācāra would provide a basis for it to be perceived more directly through the five eyes (wuyan 五眼). 42 With one of these, the buddha eye (foyan 佛眼), one would be able to see that everything is of one mind (yixin 一 心), and the "two characteristics" (er xiang 二相) 43 would disappear. 44 Furthermore, in 1924, he explained that scientific observations did not take the relationship between the mind and the phenomenal world into account. As a result, the theories scientists developed on the basis of their observations were misguided. 45 Despite this, Taixu also 42 Ibid., p. 819. The five eyes is a notion taken from Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (Yuqie shidi lun 瑜伽師地論; Discourse on the Stages of Concentration Practice): the physical eye; the heavenly eye; the wisdom eye, the dharma eye; and the buddha-eye. 43 The universal and particular characteristics of Suchness. 44 Taixu, "Weiwu kexue yu weishi zong xue," p. 819. 45 Taixu, " Both approaches, however, were useful and pursued truth from different levels of depth:
"Buddhism's explanations are deep but its level of detail is shallow," whereas "science's explanations are shallow but its level of detail is deep." 49 Taixu therefore saw the future of Yogācāra and science as one in which they could complement one another. 50 In time, scientists would come to appreciate Buddhism's explanatory power. He provided a further example of this by stating that among the "worldly methods of seeking knowledge, science is more excellent,"
but that Buddhism could "improve" the "six senses and eight consciousnesses," increasing one's capacity to observe reality directly, 51 thus leading to improved scientific observations. This led Taixu to suggest that in the future, "Yogācāra methods could . . . increase the limited powers of 46 Ibid., p. 813. 47 Taixu, "Renshengguan de kexue," p. 6. 48 Ibid., p. 5. 49 Taixu, "Yue Weishi xin lun jianshu 閱'唯識新論'簡述" (A Concise Account of My Reading of "A New Treatise scientists' powers of observations so that they could use their scientific instruments to full effect.
Biology
As might be expected from this comment, Taixu While Buddhism embodied existing biological knowledge, Yogācāra could be used to fill gaps in our understanding of processes such as reproduction. In 1923, drawing from the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (Discourse on the Stages of Concentration Practice), 54 Taixu explained that it was the base consciousness that in fact enabled male and female gametes to form a zygote, 52 Taixu, "Renshengguan de kexue," p. 54. Besides suggesting that psychology and Yogācāra could perform these different roles,
Taixu also felt they shared common knowledge regarding the senses and certain cognitive functions. In the context of the 1920s, this was an important verification of Buddhism's compatibility with modern science. He thus explained that the Buddhist five sensory faculties (wu gen 五根) 61 should be equated with the nervous system. 62 The first six consciousnesses were the subjects of psychological investigations, whereas the independently arising thinking consciousness (dutou yishi 獨頭意識)-the sixth consciousness-was what psychologists called the "imagination." 63 Meanwhile, the sensory abilities (shengyi gen 勝意根) were akin to nerves joined to organs, such as the optic or auditory nerves. 64 
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Taixu held that the root of the problem was psychology's basis in materialistic science, which assumed that life was subject to mechanistic laws. 71 He explained, however, that recent developments in science-such as relativity-had shown that matter existed only in interdependent relationships. As a result, "old nineteenth-century materialism" was now untenable. 72 With its detailed discussion of the relationship between the mind and the phenomenal world, Yogācāra was clearly in a position to advance science into the postmaterialistic age.
This approach to scientific explanations of mental functioning distinguished him from a figure who, in many ways, was his predecessor, Tan Sitong. Taixu had read Tan's Renxue (An Exposition of Benevolence) early in his career, and later wrote that he loved it "so much that I could not part with it." 73 Although Tan claimed that all "Western Learning" stemmed from Buddhism, 74 the emphasis of the book is on the essential agreement between different religious perspectives and branches of science. Whereas Tan had sought to locate Yogācāra's cognitive architecture in the brain, Taixu held that the "physical mind" (routuan 肉團) was merely a "form dharma" (sefa 色法); 75 that is, an object of sensory perception, rather than the mind itself (xinfa 71 Taixu, "Fa yu ren zhi yanjiu 法與人之研究" (Research on the Dharma and Human Beings), in TDQS, vol. 9 心法) or its mental functions (xinsuo 心所). And even though psychologists assigned memories a physical location within the brain, the brain was too small to store all of them. According to Taixu, the base consciousness provided a superior explanation for the retention of memory. 76 His approach was thus more closely aligned with that of the more critical Wuchang School. He explained this in some detail in 1927, when he wrote that social evolution's first stage was one of idolatrous semihuman people who were primarily occupied with survival. In the second stage, society was characterized by theistic religion and a system of government.
Social evolution
Eventually, theism was discarded in favor of mathematics, ethics, rationality, and science. The Thomson explained notions of space, time, and matter with a story about an "intelligence" that, upon arriving in a field, initially lacked these concepts. Eventually, the spirit learned to distinguish between itself and the outside world, creating a dualistic view of reality. When it observed a flower with a wasp on it, the intelligence initially regarded both as part of a unified world external to the self. When the wasp flew into the intelligence's hand, it discovered that there were different points in space, and arrived at concepts such as "here" and "there." After being stung by the wasp, the intelligence also learned about different points in time, and thus gained the ability to distinguish between "before" and "after." Having thus conceptualized space and time, it subsequently went on to develop ideas concerning matter.
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Thomson's story was intended to illustrate the principles of relativity. Taixu, however, claimed it was useful for both explaining Yogācāra and simultaneously pointing out the flaws in Einstein's theory:
Although this explanation of the origins of knowledge concerning space, time, and matter has not reached the level of depth of the explanation concerning this origin in the base consciousness, it is near enough! It speaks of a primitive real essence (zhenti 真體) 87 -an intelligence completely lacking in experience. We may call this the base consciousness.
When it suddenly appears here, it first experiences the environment, and all things within it, as an entirety (quanti 全體). The natural world and the body with senses (genshen 根 239 身) appear simultaneously to the base consciousness. The body and the environment are then understood to be two things. Next, the manas grasps the base consciousness as something internal to the self. The intelligence thus has a body, and assumes this to be its center of thought. It begins to distinguish between "here" and "there." Then, the consciousness, considering the body to be real, gives rise to the distinction between the self and those things attached to the self (wo wosuo 我我所). Following on from this, the first six consciousnesses divide and combine different things in the environment: this flower, the wasp, this hand, the wasp which is first at the flower and then is by the hand, then material objects, space, time-all of these "burning lamps" (chiran Again, this assumption had no adequate justification; for there is clearly no reason why the whole material universe should be restricted to the narrow framework along which messages strike our senses. To illustrate by an analogy, the earthquake waves which damage our houses travel along the surface of the ground, but we have no right to assume that they originate in the surface of the ground; we know, on the contrary, that they originate deep in the earth's interior.
95
As a result, "the whole picture, and the manifold dimensions of space in which it is drawn, become pure mental constructs-diagrams and frameworks we make for ourselves to help us understand phenomena."
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Such comments led Taixu to conclude that since nineteenth-century physics was deficient, the only remaining option was to renovate it using the tools provided by Yogācāra. When Jeans stated that scientific truths could be expressed only through the use of metaphors, Taixu claimed this was akin to the difference between the posited reality (anlidi 安立諦)-the attempt to express truths about reality using language-and unposited reality (fei anlidi 非安立諦), or ultimate truth. Similarly, Jeans's example of our inability to directly sense the origin of an 95 Ibid., p. 215.
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earthquake was akin to perceptions that travelled through our sensory organs, but whose origins-in the base consciousness-we were unaware of. 97 Finally, the notion that reality was a mental construction-and, as Jeans stated in his speech, the inability to distinguish between objective and subjective reality-meant that science had, as Taixu European philosophy. 97 Taixu, "Xin wulixue yu weishixue," p. 600. 98 Ibid., p. 602. 99 Taixu, "Wenhuaren yu alaiyeshi 文化人與阿賴耶識" (The Person of Culture and the Base Consciousness), in TDQS, vol. 20, pp. 237-242.
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"nothing but mind" should form the basis of a universal worldview. 112 As was the case with science, Taixu saw much that was of value in the person of culture, but the fact that the concept was so compatible with Yogācāra was evidence of its veracity. He did, however, continue to present Buddhism as a superior overarching framework in which Cassirer's theory would need to be situated in order to render it complete. Taixu's person of culture can also be read alongside his critique of Liang Shuming's promotion of Confucian culture (which Thierry Meynard discusses in this volume), because Buddhism could encompass the best of Liang's cultural typologies while remaining true to itself as a superior worldview and the pinnacle of modernity.
Conclusion
Taixu features prominently in histories of Chinese Buddhism, but less so in intellectual histories of modern China. He was, of course, a monastic, and throughout his life he was committed to the promotion of a Chinese Buddhist worldview. Yet he also maintained a broad engagement with China's republican intellectual scene, to which he contributed from his Buddhist perspective.
Perhaps he has been difficult to place as a historical figure because he was such a divisive figure in the Buddhist world (his ideas were far from universally accepted) and was not a secular intellectual. Although he did not fit in either camp, as the chapters in this volume show, the boundary between the secular and the religious was permeable for other late-Qing and republican intellectuals as well. 113 When we consider Yogācāra's role in bridging these two spheres during 112 Taixu, "Cong wuwo weixin de yuzhouguan dao pingdeng ziyou de renshengguan 從無我唯心的宇宙觀到平等 自由的人生觀" (From a Nonself-Mind-Only Worldview to an Egalitarian and Free Outlook on Life), in TDQS, vol.
22 (2005 [1930] ), p. 986.
113 Furthermore, later in Taiwan and the PRC, the nuances of his ideas were rejected by Buddhists in favor of his broad approach to an engaged Buddhism. This is because "Buddhism for the human world," as a general concept, 246 the period, Taixu's importance as an active agent at the heart of this confluence of trends becomes clear.
Taixu can therefore be considered a republican-era intellectual (rather than just a Buddhist reformer) who contributed to ongoing discussions of modernity from his unique stance in traditional Chinese Buddhism. He was concerned with showing that rather than being superstitious and outmoded, Buddhism was capable of furthering modernist projects more effectively than Western scientific, philosophical, and ideological instruments themselves. In his wide-ranging essays and speeches on diverse subjects that included scientific knowledge and its foundations, as well as society and the individual, Yogācāra played an important part in this critical assessment of modernity. While on the one hand, it was evident through Yogācāra that
Buddhism shared important similarities with his conception of Western modernity, on the other, he saw Yogācāra as capable of correcting the deficiencies of modernity. Yogācāra was therefore a crucial aspect of his overall intellectual project in that it helped him articulate a modern Buddhist approach to engaging with Western science, philosophy, and ideology-which he felt was the only viable path for China's future.
had great currency whereas many of his specific ideas did not accord with ideological or scientific developments in the ensuing decades, or were too divisive for broad acceptance.
